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█ Abstract  Systematic Knowledge Research is the approach used to (i) describe the specific characteristics of vari-
ous forms of knowledge (such as e.g. conceptual and non-conceptual knowledge; explicit and implicit knowledge; 
knowing-how and knowing-that). It (ii) investigates the overlapping points among the various kinds of knowledge 
forms, and it (iii) elucidates the mechanisms of interpenetration among them. Systematic Knowledge Research (iv) 
grasps the dynamic of various forms of knowledge and their interplay, and (v) describes the practices and the man-
ifestations of knowledge. Systematic Knowledge Research provides analyses and suggestions for modeling each of 
the five fields as well as their interconnections. Because of these objectives Systematic Knowledge Research is differ-
ent from both the traditional theory of knowledge and the varieties of science studies and meets the current desid-
eratum to systematically broaden and revise the territory of epistemology. 
KEYWORDS: Knowledge Research; Epistemology; Types of Knowledge; Epistemic Cultures; Science Studies.  
 
█ Riassunto  La ricerca sistematica sul sapere. Ripensare l’epistemologia – Systematic Knowledge Research è il no-
me di un approccio adottato per (i) descrivere il profilo caratteristico di varie forme di sapere (per esempio, tra 
gli altri, il sapere concettuale e non-concettuale; il sapere esplicito e implicito; il sapere-come e il sapere-che). 
Questo approccio (ii) indaga le sovrapposizioni tra le diverse tipologie di forme del sapere e (iii) chiarifica i 
meccanismi della loro compenetrazione. La Systematic Knowledge Research (iv) coglie le dinamiche di varie 
forme di sapere, la loro cooperazione, (v) descrivendo le pratiche e i modi di manifestazione del sapere. La Sy-
stematic Knowledge Research propone analisi e suggerimenti per modellare ognuno dei cinque campi d’indagine 
sopra menzionati, unitamente alle loro interconnessioni. Perseguire questi obiettivi segna la diversità tra 
l’approccio della Systematic Knowledge Research da una parte e quello della teoria della conoscenza tradizionale 
e dei diversi tipi di Science Studies dall’altra. La Systematic Knowledge Research viene incontro all’aspettativa 
contemporanea tesa all’ampliamento e alla revisione sistematica del territorio dell’epistemologia. 




█ Types and forms of knowledge  
 and their taxonomy 
 
Knowledge IS A BASIC WORD not only in con-
nection with the current discussions of the 
knowledge society. Different forms of knowledge 
play an important role in people’s lives. This is 
the case with everyday habits, customs, compe-
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tencies, and practices as well as in science, tech-
nology, and institutions of the modern civilized 
world. Therefore, the different forms of 
knowledge and in particular their interactions 
at the interface of human cognition, communi-
cation, and cooperation (which might be called 
the CCC-triangulation) deserve increased at-
tention and should be analyzed and reflected 
on thoroughly. More precisely, knowledge 
plays a fundamental role in all processes of hu-
man perception, speech, thought, and action. 
The fluid function of the triangular relation be-
tween an individual, other persons, and the 
world always already involves and presupposes 
indispensable forms of knowing.1 
The least reflection reveals how multifari-
ous and how broad the meaning of the word 
“knowledge” is. Even beyond the domains of 
science, technology, philosophy, and the arts, 
the word crops up throughout everyday life and 
in the most various contexts.  One need only 
think of phrases like, “knowing for certain”, 
“knowing the score”, “knowing how to size 
things up”, “let him know”, “knowing a hawk 
from a handsaw”, “knowing how to dress one-
self”, “a knowing look”, “knowing how things 
go”, “knowing the thing to do”, “knowing what 
counts as an argument”, and countless others. 
The following brief taxonomy of knowledge 
forms marks out some of the principal distinc-
tions between various different forms and con-
cepts of knowledge.  
This spectrum of forms of knowledge ex-
tends from everyday cases (e.g. knowing how 
to open a car door, or how to organize one’s 
day) to cases of artistic knowledge (e.g. know-
ing how to depict something, or how to render 
something expressive – in dance, music, or 
painting) and to cases of scientific knowledge 
as well (e.g. knowing how to conduct a meth-
odological investigation in the natural sciences, 
in mathematics, or in the social sciences). 
▶ First, one must distinguish between a nar-
row and a broad concept of knowledge: 
(a) The narrow concept of knowledge per-
tains to acts of cognition that are bound up 
with method-governed procedures and with 
justification, truth, rationalization, and demon-
strability. Any instance of this sort of know-
ledge must be able to be discussed, must be 
communicable, tradable and intersubjectively 
verifiable. The sciences are paradigmatically 
characterized by such a concept of knowledge. 
(b) The broad concept of knowledge signi-
fies, on the one hand, (i) the abilities involved 
in adequately grasping what is going on and 
what various things (e.g. a gesture, an image, a 
sentence) are about. On the other hand (ii), it 
also pertains to the realm of basic human capa-
bilities, competencies, abilities, skills, practices, 
and proficiencies. In this broad sense of the ex-
pression, knowledge is an inviolable component 
of the facticity of every human action, speech 
act, thought, and perception. This broad and 
foundational domain of knowledge is an entirely 
familiar element of both our everyday lives (e.g. 
our everyday practices and know-how) as well as 
the arts and sciences. In connection with physics, 
for example, talk of such broad knowledge 
might refer to one’s competence to execute an 
observation, to construct an experimental pro-
cedure, to manipulate a mathematical model 
and to apply it to the world of physical objects 
and events. Without taking account of this 
broad sense of “knowledge” it is impossible to 
formulate a comprehensive theory of human 
perception, speech, thought, action, and cogni-
tion, much less a far-reaching and satisfactory 
epistemology. 
▶ Our next step must be to make a heuristic 
distinction between various forms of knowledge, 
such as everyday knowledge (“knowing where the 
next mailbox is”), theoretical knowledge (“know-
ing that 2+2=4”), practical knowledge (“knowing 
how to steer an automobile”), and orientational 
knowledge (“knowing what one is to do (or for-
go) in a given situation”). 
These various forms of knowledge are per-
fectly familiar. As a rule, we have a direct un-
derstanding of them. The aim of systematic 
and reflective knowledge research is to eluci-
date the peculiar profiles of knowledge forms 
as well as their interplay. But to do so requires 
various extensions, modifications, and revi-
sions of traditional and contemporary episte-
mology. For we cannot understand the sense of 
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epistemological questions regarding validity, jus-
tification, and the limits of knowledge until we 
have established which forms of knowledge (and 
which modes of their interplay) are at issue in a 
given case. To this extent, knowledge research 
must precede epistemology proper, for the latter 
always presupposes the former. To risk a pro-
vocative formulation: epistemology is a branch 
of knowledge research, not the reverse.  
Elucidating (a) the peculiar profile of vari-
ous knowledge forms, (b) their points of over-
lap, and above all (c) the mechanisms of their 
interpenetration make up some of the funda-
mental tasks of comprehensive and systematic 
knowledge research. These tasks also mark out 
desiderata for an extended and revised episte-
mology. 
 
█ Knowledge research and its objects 
 
If one explicitly asks, against the back-
ground of what has been presented thus far, 
“what is knowledge research and what makes it 
so valuable?”, my answer can be given as five 
interconnected themes and desiderata. System-
atic and reflective knowledge research is con-
cerned to (i) conceptually elucidate and de-
scribe the peculiar profiles of various forms of 
knowledge; (ii) identify and investigate the 
points of overlap between the various kinds of 
knowledge forms; (iii) elucidate the mecha-
nisms of interplay and interpenetration be-
tween various forms of knowledge; (iv) grasp 
and model the dynamic of various forms of 
knowledge and their interplay; (v) describe the 
practices and the manifestations of knowledge. 
Knowledge research thus defines its field in 
terms of the objects of its investigation. It aims 
to provide descriptions, analyses, therapy, and 
suggestions for modeling each of the five fields 
and to elucidate the mechanisms of the respec-
tive processes, states, and phenomena. And this 
enterprise is principally valuable because it is 
primarily these mechanisms which support the 
fluent function of human perception, speech, 
thought, and action as well as the whole net-
work of triangular relations between subject, 
other subjects, and world. 
We can no longer conceive of our task as 
one of setting various forms of knowledge 
against one another, or presenting them as mu-
tually exclusive – though it goes without saying 
that a closer view of each form of knowledge 
will also bring to light their several differences. 
But such differences arise even within a single 
form of knowledge. For example, within “scien-
tific knowledge”, we must distinguish between 
mathematical, physical, technological, and com-
putational knowledge. 
Needless to say, knowledge research, as we 
conceive it, is by no means limited to the study 
of science (which investigates the production 
and reception of the sciences). Along with sci-
entific knowledge, our approach to knowledge 
research takes account of all the other forms of 
knowledge and sets them on an equal footing. 
Thus, systematic knowledge research is shifting 
from the traditional and vertical picture of a 
pyramid of forms of knowledge (with mathe-
matics and sciences on top) to the picture of a 
spectrum of different forms of knowledge. Sci-
entific knowledge is a tremendously important 
and well established form of knowing. But it is 
hardly the one and only such form, nor the only 
metaphysically respectable one. It is not at all 
difficult to bring out the central role of practi-
cal, moral, and aesthetic knowledge for our un-
derstanding of the world, others, and ourselves. 
Moreover, it is of the first importance that 
we not reduce various forms of knowledge to a 
single form, as though there were The One and 
Only Foundational Form of Knowledge, and that 
we not seek out their common denominator in 
the hopes of reducing them to some third 
thing. In light of this irreducible plurality, and 
in the absence of a third term to serve as a 
common denominator, we are systematically 
(not just contingently) obliged to reject the 
view that there is ultimately just a single (e.g. 
scientific) perspective from which to consider 
epistemological questions and that everything 
that can be said about knowledge must be ar-
ticulable from within that perspective. Yet I 
need hardly point out that this irreducible plu-
rality does not by any means lead to relativism 
about knowledge forms. For there are strict 
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theoretical, practical, and everyday restrictions 
on the degree of this plurality. It would seem 
that not everything that presents itself as 
“knowledge” actually is knowledge – neither in 
the everyday, factical sense, nor in the theoreti-
cally grounded sense. We are just as subject to 
crises and breakdowns in everyday life as are 
our theories. 
 
█ Knowledge research as a reflective, 
fundamental investigation 
 
Knowledge research also becomes neces-
sary whenever the intradisciplinary and intra-
philosophical problematics we face (not to 
mention the social challenges that confront 
us) can no longer be defined or resolved in a 
purely disciplinary manner. In the face of such 
challenges, systematic knowledge research re-
veals itself to be a transdisciplinary, reflective 
investigative enterprise.2 
Such intradisciplinary problematics can be 
seen in various new fields (which have in fact 
recently sprouted up in various disciplines, 
sciences, and technologies) – fields such as e.g. 
the transdisciplinary research across the board 
on structures, processes, systems, materials, or 
imaging. 
Examples of such intraphilosophical prob-
lematics abound. Consider this one. To deter-
mine the nature of “consciousness” (or the 
“mind”), it does not suffice to merely list the 
findings of philosophy, cognitive science, neu-
roscience, psychology, computer science, lin-
guistics, and other disciplines. The challenge 
rather consists in determining which subfields 
are so much as capable of contributing to an-
swering the question. 
Well known examples of social issues that 
call for transdisciplinary solutions are problems 
concerning energy, the environment, climate 
change, health care, the financial system, and 
education. 
Against the horizon of such considerations, 
the fourfold moral of systematic and reflective 
knowledge research can be formulated quite 
economically. (i) It is the intraphilosophical, 
intradisciplinary, and intrasocietal challenges 
which call for the disciplines, theorems, reflec-
tions, and practices conducive to their solution, 
not the reverse. (ii) Systematic and reflective 
knowledge research can also have direct rele-
vance for object-based studies and research. Its 
results can, for example, be integrated into the 
design of new experimental, theoretical, and re-
flective strategies and applied to existing systems 
and practices of knowledge and research or even 
incorporated into pedagogical approaches and 
teaching curricula. (iii) Knowledge research is a 
reflective discipline and, at the same time, a basic 
research program. (iv) Knowledge research is 
characterized by the discovery, development, 
and active shaping of pragmatic heuristics that 
are fundamental to our knowledge in both the 
narrow and the broad sense.  
To the extent that knowledge research suc-
ceeds in accomplishing these tasks, it is capable 
of contributing to our orientation in everyday 
life, in the sciences, and in the arts. Indeed, 
helping to orient us in this manner constitutes a 
great deal of the humane significance of sys-
tematic and reflective knowledge research. But 
it should go without saying that such an ap-
proach also takes account of the normative as-
pects involved in the aforementioned process-
es, states, and phenomena. Knowledge of 
norms and one’s orientation is of the utmost 
significance to knowledge research inasmuch as 
it affects the whole spectrum of forms of 
knowledge – from the broad, factical forms, to 
the more narrow, propositional ones. 
 
█ Knowledge research in action:  
 Four examples of interaction between 
different forms of knowledge 
 
A taxonomy of forms of knowledge is com-
paratively easy to produce, and it may even be 
possible to establish broad agreement about its 
basic form fairly quickly. The mechanisms and 
practices by means of which forms of 
knowledge interact and interpenetrate one an-
other, by contrast, remain altogether unex-
plored. Such mechanisms are, however, inti-
mately familiar to us in as much as we encoun-
ter them in the practices of everyday life, sci-
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ence, art, and knowledge. As a rule, they per-
form their functions fluently. Indeed it is only 
when they break down (or we are practicing 
philosophy) that we tend to explicitly ask ques-
tions about them at all. We principally come to 
realize how scanty our acquaintance with the 
mechanisms by which our forms of knowledge 
interweave and interact really is only after their 
acute breakdown and in the course of our at-
tempts to reestablish their fluent functioning in 
our perception, speech, thought, and action. In-
deed, it is primarily then that we come to appre-
ciate their situatedness in our practices and life-
worlds. Systematic and reflective knowledge re-
search views the elucidation of these mecha-
nisms and practices as one of its foremost chal-
lenges. In the following, I wish to clarify the na-
ture of this challenge by considering it in the 
light of four more tangible examples. 
 
█ Example 1: Conceptual  
 and non-conceptual knowledge 
 
Knowing that the nearest mailbox is up by 
the next intersection means being in possession 
of propositional knowledge-that, and is a case of 
conceptual knowledge. Conceptual knowledge is 
bound to its articulation in a language and must 
be communicable in language. Both of these fea-
tures are particularly manifest in scientific lan-
guages (e.g. in the language of physics), but they 
are also to be found in (and important to) ordi-
nary language.3 
Forms of non-conceptual knowledge in-
clude, for example, knowing how to open a car 
door, bake cinnamon bread, or ski, or knowing 
what it is like to have a sensation of color, or to 
feel jealous. The former variants of non-
conceptual knowledge come from the realm of 
practical or procedural knowing-how. The lat-
ter variants belong to the realm of sensory-
aesthetic experience and thus constitute a type 
of knowledge one can only acquire through 
firsthand experience, not simply pick up in a 
lecture hall or from a theoretical understanding 
of the phenomena. 
Closer examination of our actual engage-
ments with knowledge quickly shows that, in 
reality, we are by no means confronted with 
just a ‘single pure’ form of knowledge. The actu-
al phenomena, processes, and states actually in-
volved in our knowledge already involve a fusion 
of different forms of knowledge. It is only by 
means of post factum and post phenomenon heu-
ristic reflection that we subsequently analyze the 
phenomena, processes, and states into distinct 
constituents. But the holism intrinsic to forms of 
knowledge can be heuristically differentiated as 
the interplay of conceptual and non-conceptual 
knowledge (indeed, any sufficiently fine-grained 
examination will reveal this holism within each 
individual form of knowledge, including concep-
tual or non-conceptual knowledge). 
Examples of such modes of interplay and in-
terpenetration are easy to adduce. Think, for 
example, of how a cellist must combine her 
non-conceptual aesthetic experience, her non-
conceptual knowledge of tonal coloration and 
expression, her practical knowledge of how to 
manipulate her instrument with her conceptual 
knowledge of the structure and peculiarities of 
the notation and score of, e.g., György Ligeti’s 
1966 concerto for cello and orchestra. 
Or one might consider the everyday situa-
tion of preparing a tasty meal. Here the cook 
has to combine his non-conceptual gustatory 
experience and his non-conceptual knowledge 
of the combination of ingredients with his ex-
plicitly conceptual knowledge of the cookbook 
recipe and the linguistic formulations of the in-
structions and rules it contains. It is only in 
combination of these components that saffron 
rice and marinated mango chicken can turn in-
to a delicious dish. 
Yet one could equally well consider what 
takes place in, say, the laboratory of an experi-
mental physicist. In addition to her explicit con-
ceptual knowledge of the theoretical setup of 
the experiment and of the hypothesis that is 
actually to be tested, non-conceptual capacities 
are also drawn on in performing the experi-
ment itself. The latter might include the tech-
nical and practical operation of the material 
experimental apparatus (e.g. technological 
equipment and computers). But one would also 
have to include the capacity to visually read off 
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significant signs from the computer screen and, 
indeed, the whole range of non-conceptual 
knowledge of the tensile strength or permeabil-
ity of the materials used in the experiment. And 
the latter forms of knowledge belong to our 
pre-intentional attitudes in coping with things 
and cannot be addressed as forms of conceptu-
al, linguistic knowledge-that. 
One might even consider how a competent 
speaker of English must combine her invariably 
non-conceptual knowledge and practical ability 
to speak with the conceptual knowledge of the 
semantic content of English words and sen-
tences.4 The example of the competent lan-
guage user is especially fruitful in our context 
because we have here a situation in which the 
very linguistic capacities which constitute the 
basis of all conceptual knowledge (in the nar-
row sense) themselves clearly involve and pre-
suppose non-conceptual dimensions. Non-
conceptual knowledge is thus prior to and a 
condition of conceptual knowledge. The ability 
to follow a rule in speaking a language is (as 
Wittgenstein rightly insists) not to be under-
stood as though competent speakers possessed 
some conceptual or theoretical knowledge of 
predetermined and fixed semantic rules and 
their content.5 Now this conclusion naturally 
does not alter the fact that explicit conceptual 
knowledge can conversely affect and modify 
the non-conceptual competencies and abilities 
invoked in speaking a language. 
Systematic knowledge research also calls for 
more fine-grained considerations of the modes 
of interplay between different variants of con-
ceptual knowledge among themselves, as well 
as the modes of interplay between variants of 
non-conceptual knowledge. In the latter case, 
however, the mechanisms of interaction and 
interpenetration are virtually unknown. Never-
theless, we have no difficulty in giving examples 
of such modes of interplay from everyday life, 
or from the arts and sciences. 
A simple but telling example of such inter-
play between different conceptual forms of 
knowledge in the sciences is the interaction of 
‘mathematical’ and ‘physical’ knowledge in 
physics. Both forms of knowledge are concep-
tual, and their interaction has famously gener-
ated some of the greatest achievements of 
modern natural science.  
The interplay of various non-conceptual 
forms of knowledge is an equally familiar fea-
ture of the arts and sciences as well as our eve-
ryday lives, though its mechanisms are still al-
most entirely unknown. 
Non-conceptual forms of knowledge in-
clude, inter alia, perception (e.g. a perception of 
color), experience (e.g. of a personal and im-
mediate passion), intuition (e.g. an immediate 
visual experience), and procedural, practical 
abilities or knowing-how (e.g. bike riding, 
swimming, or cello playing). 
The question of how such non-conceptual 
forms of knowledge interact and interpenetrate 
one another then becomes a question of the 
mechanisms by which forms like “perception 
and knowing-how” or “experience and know-
ing-how” interact. An example of the first sort 
of interaction would be the interplay between a 
cellist’s auditory perception (which is non-
conceptual sensible knowledge) and the practi-
cal abilities the cellist exercises in playing her 
instrument (which is non-conceptual practical 
and procedural knowing-how). 
Further examples can easily be generated by 
considering the interplay between bodily 
movements, sounds, and gestures (e.g. in ballet 
dancing). Brain surgery, for example, requires 
the surgeon to connect her view of the monitor 
(and thus her non-conceptual, visual knowledge) 
with her deft hand movements (and thus her 
non-conceptual, haptic knowledge) and to coor-
dinate these with her experience (not least of all 
with the non-conceptual portions of her prac-
tice-based experiential knowledge) and still fur-
ther forms of non-conceptual knowledge. 
 
█ Example 2: Explicit and implicit knowledge 
   
Knowledge always contains more than just 
what one knows, and we know more than we 
can say. Across the whole spectrum of 
knowledge forms – from basic, factical states of 
knowledge in practical situations to explicitly 
linguistic, propositional knowledge in the nar-
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row sense – knowledge contains and involves, 
inter alia, abilities, competencies, contexts, 
background conditions, attitudes, goals, pur-
poses, networks of beliefs, habits, habitualized 
patterns, and tacitly presupposed assumptions 
of somatic, neural, and physical processes (such 
as, for example, the activities of the central 
nervous system). 
In knowing something, we needn’t be explic-
itly conscious of any these components. Indeed, 
focusing one’s attention on these components 
(not to mention completely articulating them in 
propositional form) can often disturb or even 
derail our capacity for explicit knowledge or our 
ability to successfully learn a technique or a prac-
tice (e.g. bike-riding, or cello-playing). In order 
to so much as have explicit and conscious 
knowledge of something, one must already pre-
suppose and rely on a great deal of implicit, un-
specified, and unconscious knowledge. Accord-
ingly, we can choose to investigate either the 
particular profile of explicit knowledge, or that 
of implicit knowledge. 
Michael Polanyi gives a well-known exam-
ple of implicit knowledge.6 I am hammering a 
nail into the wall. My conscious attention is 
(distally) trained wholly on the nail and the 
hammer. But there are many other components 
in play, of which I am not explicitly aware, but 
which are essential to my successfully hammer-
ing the nail into the wall – e.g. the motion of 
my hand, the placement of my fingers with re-
spect to my palm, the pressure of my grip on 
the hammer’s handle, and many other things. 
Thus, much implicit knowledge (in the broad 
sense) must already be in play in order for me 
to so much as act, or gain my orientation. But 
in many cases, this implicit knowledge must 
not become explicit at the moment of the ac-
tion’s execution (e.g. while I am swinging the 
hammer, or, in a scientific context, while a 
physical measurement is being performed). 
Otherwise I am far more likely to hit my thumb 
than the nail or even land myself in the emer-
gency room. 
These interconnections are just as charac-
teristic of the everyday knowledge proper to 
our life-world as they are of our artistic or sci-
entific knowledge. The ability to make discov-
eries presupposes precisely this relation of 
proximal and distal aspects of knowledge. Sys-
tematic and reflective knowledge research can 
thus be described as an attempt to analyze just 
this relationship between explicit and implicit 
knowledge in a way that is fruitful for questions 
regarding knowledge and epistemology. If all 
knowledge were explicit knowledge, then re-
search and discovery would be impossible. 
Conversely, since research and problem solving 
clearly are possible, it cannot be that all 
knowledge is explicit knowledge. 
It is important to me here – as both an epis-
temological and a methodological point – that 
the relation of implicit to explicit knowledge 
not be conceived as though implicit knowledge 
somehow unconsciously encapsulated a con-
tent that need only be made public and discur-
sive. The contours and profile of explicit 
knowledge are simply different from those of 
implicit knowledge. In becoming explicit, 
something gets added to implicit knowledge. 
This transition involves, among other things, 
increased distal attention and cognitive deter-
minacy (which is coupled with consciousness 
and, in cases of knowledge in the narrow sense, 
also coupled with communicability, evidence, 
justification, and methodological order). This 
point is very important to me. For in contem-
porary philosophical discussion, one all too of-
ten encounters the view that everything de-
pends on making implicit knowledge explicit. 
Indeed, Robert Brandom’s title “making it ex-
plicit” has become a veritable slogan in con-
temporary discourse.7 The picture connected 
with this view strikes me as singularly ill-suited 
to capture or adequately describe the peculiar 
character and role of the interplay and inter-
penetration of various forms of knowledge in 
our actual perception, speech, thought, and ac-
tion. And it is not just the processes proper to 
our everyday life-world that this conception 
fails to capture, it is equally incapable of grasp-
ing such modes of interplay in the sciences, and 
is utterly hopeless in approaching the arts. 
Consideration of the interplay between im-
plicit and explicit knowledge as well as the in-
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terplay between the proximal and distal aspects 
internal to implicit knowledge can (as Michael 
Polanyi rightly claims) provide us with the 
means to understand what actually happens 
when knowledge is generated in a creative way.8 
So long as we do not begin by assuming that all 
knowledge is explicit, we can invoke the dis-
tinction between explicit and implicit 
knowledge (and their different internal consti-
tutions) to resolve this paradox. For our con-
ception of implicit knowledge as a kind of in-
termediary state between explicit knowledge 
and total ignorance can help us understand 
what happens when, by exercising her creative 
abilities, someone generates new knowledge. 
This opens up issues regarding the processes of 
generating, extending, modifying, and specify-
ing our knowledge. Indeed, it serves to demon-
strate that such processes are only possible 
against the background of knowledge that is as 
yet not explicit but rather unspecified and im-
plicit. Systematic and reflective knowledge re-
search investigates precisely this relationship 
between explicit and implicit knowledge. 
 
█ Example 3: Distributed and integrated 
knowledge 
   
Let us now consider the ways in which dis-
tributed and integrated forms of knowledge 
interact with and interpenetrate one another – 
a phenomenon with which we are intimately 
familiar both in everyday life, and in the arts 
and sciences. The following four scenarios 
should help to clarify the range of phenomena 
in question. 
 
█ The apartment 
   
Say that an apartment has sustained exten-
sive water damage. Repairing such damage re-
quires the interplay of altogether different ex-
perts and different forms of knowledge. The 
architect, electricians, plumbers, painters, con-
struction workers, heating specialists, (and, if 
the apartment is under historical protection, 
restoration specialists) must all work together. 
What is necessary is a problem-oriented coop-
eration of various experts and of various forms 
of knowledge with the aim of restoring the 
apartment to a habitable condition. The em-
bodied knowledge of any single worker would 
be insufficient to repair the damage: what is 
necessary is an integrative interplay of distrib-
uted forms of knowledge. 
 
█ Driving a car 
   
To successfully set a car into motion and 
steer it requires, inter alia, the technical-
functional knowledge of what a steering wheel is 
and how the gear shift operates, a visual 
knowledge of the gas gauge and speedometer, 
practical knowledge expressed as the skillful 
hand movements required to operate the blink-
ers, the practical competency involved in using a 
GPS system. Moreover, we not only assume that 
one must be able to successfully integrate many 
of these forms of knowledge in order to count as 
a competent driver. We also accept that, though 
the automobile (or, say an “Airbus 380”) itself 
constitutes a highly complex technical system of 
the most various technologies and forms of 
knowledge, the driver (or pilot) need not have all 
of this knowledge ready to hand at all times. In 
the rule, we simply rely on the fluent interplay of 
forms of knowledge, at least as long as their in-
teraction continues to be frictionless and break-
downs are righted promptly. 
 
█ The operation room 
   
On what does the neurosurgeon rely in 
opening the brainpan of a patient and perform-
ing open brain surgery? Neurosurgeons tend to 
respond that they rely on their eyes and their 
view of the monitor (i.e. on the imaging process 
and, in this sense, on pictorial knowledge), on 
their practical skill or the knowing-how ex-
pressed in their deft and skillful hand move-
ments, and on the knowledge gained through 
their long experience. A neurosurgeon’s activi-
ties constitutively rely upon the integrative in-
terplay of different forms of knowledge and 
each of her actions presupposes this interplay 
as a matter of course. 




   
Any experimental laboratory or research lab 
showcases a complex interplay of various 
knowledge forms, practices, and dynamics. 
One need only ask an experimental scientist to 
learn how multifaceted their activities are. Ex-
perimental cultures can be described as constel-
lations of interplay between distributed and in-
tegrated forms of knowledge, in which various 
knowledge forms, practices, and dynamics are 
trained on specific objects of investigation. 
 
█ Example 4: Knowing-how  
 and knowing-that   
 
The abilities, practices, procedures, compe-
tencies, skills, proficiencies, and established 
habits signified by the expression “knowing-
how” are intimately familiar to us. And this is 
true across the whole spectrum of our experi-
ence – from our everyday practices (e.g. know-
ing how to open a refrigerator) through our ac-
quired skills and abilities (e.g. swimming or ty-
ing a necktie) to higher-level activities (e.g. 
knowing how to follow rules in speech, 
thought, and action, or knowing how to con-
struct a mathematical proof). 
Knowing-how is procedural knowledge, 
knowledge in action – it is not knowledge of 
fact or theoretical knowledge, and it is not pri-
marily articulable in linguistic propositions. Ra-
ther, the cardinal features of knowing-how are 
the acquisition, refinement, and ultimate ex-
ploitation of one’s competency in following 
rules. And that goes for higher-level competen-
cies as well – even for competencies at the 
highest level – like the ability to speak a lan-
guage, or reflect upon the conditions of the va-
lidity of rules and norms (e.g. of arithmetical 
rules, rules of everyday comportment, or moral 
and ethical rules). 
Knowing how to maintain one’s balance 
while riding a bike (or learning how to ride a 
bike) doesn’t by any means require prior and 
explicit propositional knowledge of the corre-
sponding physical laws, the appropriate angle 
of the handlebars, requisite pressure to apply 
with one’s arms, the proper posture of one’s 
upper-body, the coordination of foot and hand 
movements. If such knowledge did constitute a 
condition of the ability to ride a bike, only a few 
geniuses would possess the perfect comprehen-
sion of physics and mathematics involved in 
successfully riding a bike. 
Rule-following – which is, for example, in-
volved in the practice of successfully maintain-
ing one’s balance while riding a bike – does (or 
need) not involve following a rule which has 
been previously established through physical 
laws. It is rather in virtue of practice, training, 
guidance, practical demonstration and imita-
tion that one can acquire and subsequently re-
fine and exploit this ability, competency, or 
technique. It is something I have referred to in 
another context as the regularity bound up 
with the exercise of a practice – an “intra-praxis 
regularity” (as opposed to a “criterial rule”).9 
By way of conclusion, I would like to go a 
bit beyond the foregoing four examples of how 
various forms of knowledge can interact and 
interpenetrate and indicate just two conse-
quences and theoretical desiderata that arise 
against the background we have sketched. In 
particular, I will discuss (section 5) the correla-
tion of “forms of knowledge with forms of rep-
resentation” and (section 6) the correlation of 
“knowledge forms with creativity”. 
 
█ Forms of knowledge and creativity 
  
As we indicated in example 2 (“explicit and 
implicit knowledge”), reflection on the modes 
of interaction and interpenetration between 
different forms of knowledge can shed light on 
how radically new knowledge is created. One of 
the principle characteristics of creativity – both 
in everyday life, in philosophy, and in the arts 
and sciences – is the fact that it involves draw-
ing on a number of different forms of 
knowledge in one’s associations, thought, and 
experiments. 
Recall, for example, one of the most creative 
transfers of one domain onto another: the ap-
plication of mathematics to the realm of physi-
cal objects and events. As we mentioned earlier, 
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the mathematicization of natural science is one 
of the key presuppositions and greatest 
achievements of modernity – and one that con-
tinues to gain in importance. It is often the 
mathematical formalism and the relevant fun-
damental mathematical equations that first cir-
cumscribe and determine what even counts as a 
relevant object of physical investigation – an 
object that can subsequently be correlated with 
a mathematical model. In particular, what we 
have here is an interplay and interpenetration 
of mathematical and physical knowledge. For in 
each such case there is an explicit step involved 
in going from the mathematical formalism to its 
application to the domain of physical objects. 
And this simultaneously presupposes and relies 
upon the interplay of theoretical knowledge 
(knowing-that) and practical knowledge (know-
ing-how) of its appropriate application. 
Cases of radical creativity – e.g. the 
groundbreaking scientific discoveries and artis-
tic achievements of a Beethoven, Lobachevsky, 
Copernicus, Einstein, Cézanne, Picasso, 
Schönberg, Heisenberg, or a Michelangelo – 
involve processes which break with established 
rules, principles, and basic patterns fundamen-
tal to some system and replace them with new 
principles, rules, and patterns. Famous exam-
ples include: the transition to non-Euclidian 
geometry, Schönberg’s break with tonal music, 
the transition from the linear to the circular no-
tation of Kekulé’s model of benzene. 
In addition to identifying the psychological 
characteristics of creative people, one can also 
attempt to clarify and to describe (at least to a 
certain extent) the phenomenology of creative 
processes. This is no small job, but does belong 
among the tasks of systematic and reflective 
knowledge research, which shares certain as-
pects in common with the research on creativi-
ty. A minimal phenomenology of creativity 
would certainly have to include such aspects as 
the ability to venture to draw analogies be-
tween various forms of knowledge, and the 
ability to foster the interplay and interpenetra-
tion of different forms of knowledge and the 
forms of representation internally correlated 
with them. 
So, here again we find ourselves faced with 
different forms of knowledge and different 
modes of their interpenetration.  These two 
problematics form the heart of the whole en-
deavor called “systematic and reflective 
knowledge research”. Against the background 
of the triangular I–We–World relation, the en-
terprise leads us to extend and revise episte-
mology. I have here proposed some first steps 
towards new territory. Now this territory needs 
to be discovered, mapped out, and populated. 
That is the desideratum. The seas are open. 
 
█ Knowledge research and epistemology
   
As sections 1 to 4 demonstrated, knowledge 
research precedes epistemology as its necessary 
precondition. Against the background of this 
claim, I would now like to concentrate a little 
more on the relationship between knowledge 
research and epistemology. 
Epistemology is not some closed field of 
study, whose principle themes and aspects have 
been determined once and for all. Yet as far as I 
can see, contemporary epistemology has thus 
far altogether failed to adequately train its at-
tention on the different forms of knowledge or 
their dynamics, practices, or modes of inter-
penetration. I aim to make a case for doing just 
this. Now if what I urge is in fact plausible, it is 
easy to see that forms of knowledge (along with 
their mechanisms and modes of interpenetra-
tion) will not simply constitute new members 
of the existing epistemological realm. For to 
place such forms of knowledge at the center of 
our epistemological investigations calls for 
sweeping expansions and revisions of contem-
porary epistemology. And this entails that we 
can (and must) expand, shift, reexamine, and 
partly revise our conceptions of the spectrum of 
epistemological topics as well as our conception 
of who counts as an epistemologist. It seems to 
me that knowledge research calls upon us to 
proceed in a way that is coherent with contem-
porary epistemological conceptions even as we 
proceed beyond them. 
Comprehensive knowledge research should 
reject the prevailing fixation on the Gettier 
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problem.10 Large portions of epistemological 
debates have been held hostage by this problem 
for far too long. It has afflicted the literature 
with a certain Byzantine character. Moreover, 
the whole debate revolves around the narrow 
concept of knowledge as something one could 
give a definition of or criteria for. Knowledge is 
summarily characterized as justified and true, 
and all subsequent thought on the subject is 
limited to these two definitive conditions. 
Yet even within the literature on this nar-
row concept of knowledge, some authors (e.g. 
Crispin Sartwell and Ansgar Beckermann) have 
viewed it as a central difficulty that the tradi-
tional concept of knowledge cannot simultane-
ously and satisfactorily embody both compo-
nents (truth and justification). If both truth and 
justification are treated as equally necessary 
conditions, knowledge becomes an “illegitimate 
hybrid-concept”. In keeping with this conclu-
sion, the concept of knowledge itself would 
have to be abandoned as “incoherent”.11 
Yet, first of all, this suggestion runs contrary 
to our intuitions about knowledge. Inasmuch 
as we are able to successfully orient ourselves in 
the world and in relation to other people – that 
is, inasmuch as we are able to perceive, to speak 
a language, to think, to act and are able to exer-
cise our various abilities – we are quite justified 
in our conviction that we possess basic, factical 
knowledge in the broad sense. 
Second, even this suggestion has not yet 
freed itself from the stranglehold of the narrow, 
classical concept of knowledge. Methodologi-
cally speaking, the suggestion is just another 
conceptual analysis of knowledge, albeit one 
engaged in a further debate about what an ade-
quate conceptual analysis is supposed to look 
like. Since, however, sections 1 to 4 have 
demonstrated that this narrow concept of 
knowledge cannot be the primary one, the 
whole mode of argument about this point is 
quite limited in its effect. It dissipates into 
nothing as soon as we shift our epistemological 
focus to the broad sense of knowledge and to 
the whole spectrum of various knowledge 
forms that regularly confront us in sciences, 
arts, and in everyday life. 
The broad sense of knowledge – according 
to the thesis we have advanced here – is genea-
logically prior to the narrow sense and consti-
tutes one of its necessary conditions, not the re-
verse. I described the broad sense of knowledge 
as a primordial and foundational state. This 
state is a facticity that is, in varying degrees, 
proper to human “Being-In-the-World” 
(Heidegger), to all intersubjectivity between per-
sons, and to the world disclosed by such inter-
subjectivity.  Such a state cannot be subsequently 
analyzed into various constituents. 
I see here a certain family resemblance be-
tween the status of the broad concept of 
knowledge and the status that Peter Strawson 
seeks to reclaim for the concept of a person.12 
Like the concept of a person, the broad, basic, 
factical concept of knowledge cannot, strictly 
speaking, be the object of exhaustive conceptual 
analysis. For what is at issue in the broad con-
cept of knowledge is precisely a non-reducible, 
non-analyzable concept, which rather serves as 
the basis for all conceptual analysis in the narrow 
sense, inasmuch as all conceptual analysis al-
ready presupposes and relies upon it. 
In a certain sense, I share Timothy William-
son’s view that knowing should be conceived as 
«the most general factive mental state».13 
More particularly, I share his view that 
knowledge is primordial in the sense that it nei-
ther must nor can be analyzed in terms of other 
concepts (as has traditionally been attempted 
using the concepts of “belief”, “truth”, and “jus-
tification”). All attempts to do so have failed. 
And the explanation of this failure is simple: 
«knowledge has no such analysis». Knowing 
rather serves to help us analyze and explain 
many other things, but «not as something itself 
to be explained». Such a view of the matter 
«reverses the direction of explanation predom-
inant in the history of epistemology».14 I wish 
to expressly endorse such a reversal of the di-
rection of explanation in epistemology. In light 
of this reversal, reflective knowledge research 
might equally well be characterized as an at-
tempt to describe and shed light upon this new-
ly altered epistemological terrain. It is not an 
analysis of the concept of knowledge, as the lat-
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ter has been traditionally characterized in terms 
of various theoretical constituents – justifica-
tion, truth, belief. 
It is an important aspect of the broad sense 
of basic, factical knowledge that this concept is 
deeply and firmly anchored in our everyday 
language, our life-world, and our ordinary prac-
tices. We are as intimately familiar with the 
language games associated with the concept as 
we are with its corresponding actions and prac-
tices. And in light of this fact, it makes good 
sense to ask whether the well-known classical 
proposals and the variants that arose as respons-
es to difficulties with the classical proposals real-
ly exhaust our options here. One might well ask 
whether there might not be alternative theories 
of knowledge which are neither committed to 
the classical three-term model of knowledge 
(justified–true–belief) nor to the traditional 
methods of conceptual analysis. 
The answer is twofold. First, there are im-
portant approaches in roughly this direction 
which afford points of connection as well as 
points of contrast with systematic and reflec-
tive knowledge research. A few examples are 
pragmatic theories of knowledge (e.g. Edward 
Craig’s), naturalistic theories (such as Hilary 
Kornblith’s), and formal epistemologies (such 
as Vincent F. Hendricks’s).15 Second, from an 
epistemological perspective, systematic and re-
flective knowledge research understands itself 
to be a contribution to the field of such novel 
orientations. At the same time, however, it 
brings certain aspects of knowledge into view 
that call for expansions and revisions of con-
temporary epistemology. The principal way in 
which knowledge research effects these chang-
es is by freeing us from the exclusive domi-
nance of the model of ‘belief’ and the tradition-
al form of “autonomous justification”.16 
Systematic and reflective knowledge re-
search can make important contributions in 
the context of epistemological methodology 
(and hence with regard to questions about the 
structure of the “epistemological justification of 
our beliefs” and questions regarding the 
“sources of epistemic knowledge”).  The four 
most important methodological positions in 
contemporary epistemology are the follows. 
▶ “Coherentism” signifies the position ac-
cording to which the justification of a belief 
consists in its entrenchment in a lattice of other 
beliefs – i.e. in its relation to other beliefs. A 
prominent example of this position can be 
found in the work of Donald Davidson.17 
▶ “Foundationalism” signifies the position 
according to which knowledge and justification 
rest upon a presupposed basis (e.g. of percep-
tions, or of self-evident beliefs), which forms 
the foundation for the generation of all (other) 
knowledge and epistemological justification. 
Aside from its 20th Century representatives like 
Roderick Chisholm, it is only natural to men-
tion the classical locus of modern foundational-
ism – namely Descartes, in his search for a se-
cure foundation for knowledge and justifica-
tion.18 
▶ “Pragmatism” signifies the position ac-
cording to which every kind of knowledge (as 
well as all epistemological justification) can be 
traced back to and explained in terms of capac-
ities for action and the effects of such actions. 
Prominent classical pragmatists include such 
figures as William James and Ludwig Wittgen-
stein, and today authors such as Edward Craig, 
Hilary Putnam, and Robert Brandom.19 
▶ “Naturalism”, in an epistemological con-
text, signifies the position according to which 
“knowledge” is a “natural fact” and conse-
quently an object of natural scientific investiga-
tion. Such scientific investigation is taken both 
to explain the generation of knowledge as well 
as to provide the requisite epistemological justi-
fications. In contemporary debates naturalism 
is championed by numerous authors, most of 
whom champion either a physicalist or an evo-
lutionary biological perspective. Prominent 
figures include Hilary Kornblith, Ruth Milli-
kan, David Papineau, and Fred Dretske.20 
Systematic and reflective knowledge re-
search, with its focus on fundamental concep-
tual elucidation and on the interplay and inter-
penetration of various forms of knowledge, 
seeks to incorporate the positive aspects of 
each of these four principal methodological po-
sitions, yet without saddling itself with their at-
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tendant difficulties. This is clearly an ambitious 
undertaking. What follows is a rough outline of 
the dimensions along which knowledge re-
search seeks to align itself with, or decisively 




   
In the first place, the various forms of 
knowledge must, of course, be in frictionless 
agreement among themselves and also be able 
to sustain the fluent continuation of actual per-
ception, speech, thought, and action. Yet the 
fluent functioning of knowledge forms is simul-
taneously subject to the conditions of empirical 
validity. By invoking such conditions, 
knowledge research neutralizes the danger that 
threatens traditional coherentism – namely the 
danger of descending into a groundless coher-
entism of beliefs, an involuted but vacuous cer-
emony of mere coherence. 
 
█ Foundationalism 
   
It is one of the fundamental assumptions of 
knowledge research that all manifestations of 
knowledge forms are connected to semiotic 
and interpretational functions. There is no 
knowledge without signs and interpretation. 
And this point holds equally well, whether one 
is speaking of knowledge in the broad sense 
(basic, factical knowing) or in the narrow sense 
(linguistic, propositional knowledge). Semiotic 
functions and corresponding interpretational 
functions suffuse the whole spectrum of 
knowledge forms. These functions are manifest 
in the practices, dynamics, and modes of inter-
penetration proper to various forms of 
knowledge – indeed, if they were not so mani-
fest, we could not even bring into view specific 
and individuated forms of perception, speech, 
thought and action, nor could we recognize an 
experience or a representation as actual. In this 
sense, the semiotic and interpretational func-
tions are fundamental to our forms of 
knowledge and their modes of interplay. But 
they are not fundamental in an ultimate and 
metaphysical sense, but rather in a pragmatic 
sense. Thus, for example, semiotic and interpre-
tational functions are, for their own part, cultur-
ally and historically conditioned; they are modi-
fiable, alterable, revisable, temporal. In a word, 
they constitute our pragmatic semiotic and in-
terpretational foundations for the time being. 
 
█ Pragmatism 
   
Reflective knowledge research agrees with 
the pragmatist that the sources of knowledge 
and its justification are not to be sought in 
some realm of theoretical propositions or in 
their inferential relations. Knowledge research 
rather seeks these sources in the fact that we 
are minded creatures who can act – i.e. in the 
fact that we are agents in the world who are ac-
tive in relation to the world, to other people, 
and to ourselves. Such actions are essentially 
involved in the facticity of the I–We–World 
triangle. To this extent, actions as well as pro-
cedural and practical abilities, capacities, and 
competencies are of the utmost relevance to 
epistemological methodology. But critical 
knowledge research does not go on to commit 
what I would like to call the practice-centric 
fallacy, which consists in the further claim that 
knowledge is nothing but the performance of 
practical skills and which maintains that 
knowledge can ultimately be equated with ac-
tions. No such equation is possible (or even in-
telligible) with respect to either of the two sens-
es of knowledge we have distinguished – the 
broad sense of basic, factical knowing, or the 
narrow sense of propositional knowledge. 
Knowledge can indeed be conceived as a 
mental state or process that both depends on 
action and disposes one to act. (This would en-
able and require us to distinguish knowledge 
from other mental states such as remembering, 
or being convinced of something.) But it simply 
does not follow from this that knowledge can 
be equated with action. Accordingly, reflective 
knowledge research by no means seeks to re-
duce theoretical knowledge-that to practical or 
procedural knowledge-how, or to derive the 
former from the latter. It is true that a particu-
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lar piece of knowledge can be individuated in 
terms of its practical and action-initiating con-
sequences or effects, and that these effects ena-
ble us to evaluate and examine it in light of our 
praxis. But this clearly does not mean that 
knowledge and action are the same. It rather 
points up the necessity of a unified theory of 
knowledge and action.21 
 
█ Naturalism 
   
Systematic and reflective knowledge re-
search does indeed advocate a naturalization of 
knowledge (viz. of knowledge forms). That is, 
it urges us to view forms of knowledge as natu-
ral phenomena in the basic sense that they be-
long to us as human beings. But knowledge re-
search avoids the danger of scientistic reduc-
tionism. For knowledge research does not as-
sume that the scientific form of knowledge is 
the only essential and metaphysically respecta-
ble form. In place of the aforementioned old 
view on forms of knowledge as constituting a 
pyramid (with scientific knowledge at its pin-
nacle) knowledge research recommends view-
ing different forms of knowledge as distributed 
along a spectrum and inside the space of forms 
of knowledge. Moreover, it underscores the 
fact that all our knowledge (and any interplay 
between knowledge forms) will be physically 
underdetermined. We can be sure that the un-
derdeterminacy at work here is strictly inelimi-
nable, because forms of knowledge are, at all 
times and in all places, exercised and articulated 
in and through semiotic and interpretational 
functions. And the semantic and pragmatic fea-
tures of such functions systematically (not just 
contingently) elude all attempts at physical re-
duction. There simply could not be knowledge-
signs that were not physically underdeter-
mined. Or, formulated differently: the proposi-
tion that there are non-underdetermined signs 
is itself not free of underdeterminacy. 
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